Finding Out, Ch2: Sexology

       I have little knowledge of symbolic presentations of same-sex desire, but I find it incredibly restrictive for Meem, Gibson, and Alexander to write off Ellis’ claim that homosexual men tend to like green clothing. Maybe an overwhelming number of these men did prefer to wear green! Did anyone actually attempt to find information of whether or not green become a signal color, much like the term “sailor” in a greeting or a pomegranate blossom? I’m hoping that, had they researched it, they’d have mentioned finding nothing to affirm this conclusion, so it seems unlikely that they have studied this claim extensively. While promoting a view of history that is more accepting and flexible to other points of view, they’ve certainly ignored a possible claim to truth in the assumption that Ellis was, himself, assuming.

      Further, I find it interesting that Meem, Gibson, and Alexander claim that, with the availability of condoms and diaphragms, “People were not necessarily having more sex than before” (45) when removing (or at least preventing) pregnancy tends to increase the frequency and enjoyment of sex for most pairs. Knowing that women at this time and previously sought abortions illegally and painfully as the only method of reproductive control when their husbands were home, it seems unlikely that the amount of sex would stay the same. Among people who had sex for pleasure, worries about pregnancy were lessened, so they could enjoy it more (and often); among those who had sex out of (religious, marital, social) duty, sex would be at least more tolerable without the fear of pregnancy, birth, childrearing, inadequate financial support, etc.

      According to Iwan Bloch and Ulrichs, homosexuality is something that is noticeable, something that one can distinguish by appearance alone (46, 47). Beside that we know this to be faulty today, this argument fails to hold up logically. First, holding same-sex desire as the distinguishing feature has little to do with the body in the way that male or female is understood: those categorized as Urnings constituted a “third gender” but did not possess a third, distinct kind of genitalia (ignoring, as they did, intersex individuals). Second, describing male-male desire as characterized by bodies with “a considerable deposit of fat,” lacking muscles and facial hair (46), is also to assume that all men with fat and shaven faces feel same-sex desire, something that they would certainly deny. Just as men and boys today are afraid to associate themselves with anything deemed “homo,” men at the time distanced themselves from anything that they related to homosexuality, such as cross-dressing--although it was accepted and even highly regarded in theatre in the nineteenth century. If sexology marks the beginning of the development of the privatized homosexual identity, does this period also mark the beginning of homophobia?

      Lastly, the quote from David Altman at the close of the chapter suggests that other parts of the world are developing gay cultures similar the to one in the United States in the last several decades. He notes the “marked differences in women’s social and economic status” (55) in these nations, preventing the equal expression and development of lesbian spaces. If Brazil, Costa Rica, Poland, and Taiwan are following the same pattern laid out in the U.S. in the last century, perhaps the gay world and inevitable gay rights movements will also usher in a revolution in the rights of women their sexuality. One problem remains: if, in the U.S. today, the LGB community is more accepted but the people labeled as “transgender” are not, what will happen to those outside the gender and sex binaries in other countries, as well as our own?